WHERE DOES THE TRUTH LIE? GESTMIN IN THE FAMILY COURTS

This post originally appeared on the excellent Civil Litigation Brief blog and is reproduced here thanks to the kind Mr Gordan Exall saying it’s ok. Thanks Gordon! If you enjoy the blog below you may also wish to read this speech by Mostyn J on a similar theme from 2014, which Gordon also wrote about here.

 

WHERE DOES THE TRUTH LIE? GESTMIN IN THE FAMILY COURTS

This blog has looked at the “Gestmin” guidance many times. I am grateful to Lucy Reed for pointing out that it has been considered in the context of family law. In Lachaux -v- Lachaux [2017] EWHC 385 (Fam) Mr Justice Mostyn considered the guidance in relation to issues between (it transpired) former husband and wife.  (When the case was being discussed on Twitter one counsel observed that in a recent case the judge had brought copies of the Gestmin judgment to court to give to the advocates. This, the judge, stated should help concentrate minds on the relevant issues in cross-examination.)

This is another case that highlights the importance of the Gestmin guidance in relation to disputed witness evidence. These are principles that are universally applied and a detailed knowledge of them is an essential part of the litigator’s tool kit.

“I share the misgivings of Leggatt J in placing weighty reliance on carefully prepared “remembered” accounts of past events as expressed either in a witness statement or orally from the witness box.”

THE CASE

The judge was considering a factual dispute as to whether a couple had been divorced in Dubai and whether the wife knew of the Dubai proceedings.

THE JUDGMENT ON ASSESSING THE WITNESS EVIDENCE

“The facts  
  1. When making my findings about the disputed facts I have relied first on those contemporary documents which I am satisfied are authentic. In Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm)he said at paras 15 – 22:
“An obvious difficulty which affects allegations and oral evidence based on recollection of events which occurred several years ago is the unreliability of human memory.
While everyone knows that memory is fallible, I do not believe that the legal system has sufficiently absorbed the lessons of a century of psychological research into the nature of memory and the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. One of the most important lessons of such research is that in everyday life we are not aware of the extent to which our own and other people’s memories are unreliable and believe our memories to be more faithful than they are. Two common (and related) errors are to suppose: (1) that the stronger and more vivid is our feeling or experience of recollection, the more likely the recollection is to be accurate; and (2) that the more confident another person is in their recollection, the more likely their recollection is to be accurate.
Underlying both these errors is a faulty model of memory as a mental record which is fixed at the time of experience of an event and then fades (more or less slowly) over time. In fact, psychological research has demonstrated that memories are fluid and malleable, being constantly rewritten whenever they are retrieved. This is true even of so-called ‘flashbulb’ memories, that is memories of experiencing or learning of a particularly shocking or traumatic event. (The very description ‘flashbulb’ memory is in fact misleading, reflecting as it does the misconception that memory operates like a camera or other device that makes a fixed record of an experience.) External information can intrude into a witness’s memory, as can his or her own thoughts and beliefs, and both can cause dramatic changes in recollection. Events can come to be recalled as memories which did not happen at all or which happened to someone else (referred to in the literature as a failure of source memory).
Memory is especially unreliable when it comes to recalling past beliefs. Our memories of past beliefs are revised to make them more consistent with our present beliefs. Studies have also shown that memory is particularly vulnerable to interference and alteration when a person is presented with new information or suggestions about an event in circumstances where his or her memory of it is already weak due to the passage of time.
The process of civil litigation itself subjects the memories of witnesses to powerful biases. The nature of litigation is such that witnesses often have a stake in a particular version of events. This is obvious where the witness is a party or has a tie of loyalty (such as an employment relationship) to a party to the proceedings. Other, more subtle influences include allegiances created by the process of preparing a witness statement and of coming to court to give evidence for one side in the dispute. A desire to assist, or at least not to prejudice, the party who has called the witness or that party’s lawyers, as well as a natural desire to give a good impression in a public forum, can be significant motivating forces.
Considerable interference with memory is also introduced in civil litigation by the procedure of preparing for trial. A witness is asked to make a statement, often (as in the present case) when a long time has already elapsed since the relevant events. The statement is usually drafted for the witness by a lawyer who is inevitably conscious of the significance for the issues in the case of what the witness does nor does not say. The statement is made after the witness’s memory has been “refreshed” by reading documents. The documents considered often include statements of case and other argumentative material as well as documents which the witness did not see at the time or which came into existence after the events which he or she is being asked to recall. The statement may go through several iterations before it is finalised. Then, usually months later, the witness will be asked to re-read his or her statement and review documents again before giving evidence in court. The effect of this process is to establish in the mind of the witness the matters recorded in his or her own statement and other written material, whether they be true or false, and to cause the witness’s memory of events to be based increasingly on this material and later interpretations of it rather than on the original experience of the events.
It is not uncommon (and the present case was no exception) for witnesses to be asked in cross-examination if they understand the difference between recollection and reconstruction or whether their evidence is a genuine recollection or a reconstruction of events. Such questions are misguided in at least two ways. First, they erroneously presuppose that there is a clear distinction between recollection and reconstruction, when all remembering of distant events involves reconstructive processes. Second, such questions disregard the fact that such processes are largely unconscious and that the strength, vividness and apparent authenticity of memories is not a reliable measure of their truth.”
  1. In line with Leggatt J, I prefer to try to determine the truth by applying the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in Onassis and Calogeropoulos v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 403, HL:
“’Credibility’ involves wider problems than mere ‘demeanour’ which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or, though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and, if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by over-much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional, who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, it is so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part.”
  1. These views were echoed by Robert Goff LJ in The Ocean Frost [1985] 1 Lloyds Rep 1 at 57:
“Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and to the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not; and where there is a conflict of evidence such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, references to the witness’ motives and to the overall probabilities can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth.”
These wise words are surely of general application and are not confined to fraud cases (although this case includes allegations of fraud). It is certainly often difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth and I agree with the view of Mr Justice Bingham that the demeanour of a witness is not a reliable pointer to his or her honesty[4].
  1. In this case I have read the witness statements and listened to the oral explanations of the parties about events that happened up to seven years earlier. For me, that is a secondary source of evidence for determining what actually happened at that time. In my judgment, I should first rely on the contemporary documents. The mother plainly recognises that, as her response to some difficult contemporary documents was to say that the father had forged them. I have reached the conclusion that both parties have told me lies from the witness box, although the mother’s lies have been more extensive than those of the father. I have not reached this conclusion in reliance on the demeanour of the parents.”

 

Parliament on d.v. : turns out its not so easy to ask the right questions…

There was an important debate in Parliament today. The government was put on the spot about the scandalous cross examination of victims of rape by the perpetrators of such abuse. It is a shame that the video footage of the house shows so many MPs making a break for the cafe just as it started.

That this issue is being tackled (or is about to be tackled) is a good thing. It is unfortunate that it has taken so long for people to wake up to it. But I have to say that the framing and depth of the debate about this really important issue leaves something to be desired. And it does not give me great confidence that the solution will necessarily resolve the real issue.

There is some real flabbiness of definition here : There is (still) no delineation between complainant and victim, accused and perpetrator, alleged abuser / rapist and actual abuser / rapist. This should not be too hard to grasp. The presumption of innocence should not be a novel concept for our elected representatives to grasp.

Many, maybe most, of the (mainly) men accused of domestic abuse are responsible for some level of bad behaviour. Some will be guilty as charged by their ex. In other cases there is a much exaggerated grain of truth at the heart of a schedule of allegations. And some, we cannot say how many, will be innocent.

But in this really important debate about how we do justice in the family courts, this debate that has had the attention of Parliament as it rightly should – we have forgotten those victims. The victims of false or grossly exaggerated charges made wilfully or through confabulation. Maybe it’s easier to see things from only one perspective, but this isn’t about what’s easier. How can we talk about justice if we can only talk about justice for one party?

And so, the debate trundles on about why we ALLOW men to cross examine their VICTIMS. We shouldn’t allow such cross examination because we have to protect those complainants who ARE victims. But the corollary is : nor should we COMPEL victims of false allegations into having to cobble together their own cross examination, having to face a person determined to see them destroyed, having to do so without the legal aid that their accuser is entitled to. Because some of those “perpetrators” will be just that – victims who are struggling to fight off unjust allegations in order to preserve or establish a relationship with their child. Not all of them, some of them will be nasty, nasty pieces of work who (we will all agree with the benefit of hindsight after a thorough trial) did not deserve representation. But we will at least know that when the trial is over the decision is both fair and robust. And as good an approximation to “truth” as we can achieve.

I think we need to have this conversation – about the men who might not be abusers – before we rush headlong into solving this problem with the sticking plaster of appointing counsel to cross examine but not to conduct a trial or to advise an accused parent.

Not just for the sake of the innocent accused, but also for the sake of the genuine complainant. Because a family court is not like a criminal court. And a family case is not like a criminal case. Yes, it offers a whole arena in and through which a controlling man may continue to attempt to exert control. And yes, our haphazard system may inadvertently facilitate that in some cases. But there are other distinctions too.

Firstly, in the family court the parties are just that – parties. The complalnant is more than just a witness. They are a participant in the entire trial process. And as such the need for protection goes far broader than mere cross examination. The flip side is that the need for an accused to be protected against accusations that he has attempted to manipulate the trial process to exert continuing control over his victim runs throughout the litigation / trial process. An accused litigant in person can be very vulnerable indeed.

And secondly, that the parties do (usually) have a child together. This means that, however uncomfortable it may be, in all but the most exceptional of cases there will have to remain some connection between the parties for a long time – even if it is entirely indirectly through third parties.

And thirdly, because the family court can make very draconian orders – it can suspend or even terminate a relationship between child and parent – based only on evidence to the civil standard of proof. In brutal terms it is far easier for a person accused in the family court of some awful crime to be found to have perpetrated that act than in a criminal court. Again, the accused is vulnerable. And the consequences are different, but are potentially every bit as grave and lifelong as in the criminal court.

Finally, it is worth reflecting on the illuminating heading of the debate in Hansard : Domestic Violence Victims: Cross-Examination. It is broadly drawn. It is not just about rape victims any more. When ministers are reconsidering this issue and formulating proposals they need to take some real care to distinguish between the position in rape cases (specifically provided for in criminal courts) and the position in the spectrum of other cases of domestic abuse (again there are provisions in criminal courts but they only apply where the court considers that the quality of witness evidence is likely to be diminished by direct questioning). Any proposals need to distinguish between cross examination and broader participation in the trial process. They need to distinguish between : cross examination about alleged abuse (to prove or disprove it), cross examination about other matters in a case which involves (or has involved) allegations of abuse, and cross examination in a case which is nothing to do with domestic abuse but where, incidentally there is a background of domestic abuse between the parties or between a party and a witness (for example financial or civil matters between ex partners). The answers called for in each scenario might be rather different. I’m not sure the debate so far has teased any of that out.

It is really encouraging to see Parliament taking an interest in these important issues. But it is profoundly depressing to see the massive blind spot that our Parliamentarians seem to have to one whole side of the discussion – and one whole half of their constituents: the accused, who we insist on calling perpetrators as if we have entirely forgotten about the purpose of the trial in the first place – to establish guilt. Not once in the debate did anyone use the proper terms complainant and accused. Not once did anyone avert to the possibility that an allegation might not be true. It is this one eyed perspective on family courts that got us into this post-LASPO mess in the first place.

And it is profoundly depressing to see it now enter into the Hansard records as fact that “a quarter of domestic violence victims face cross-examination by their abusers.” And not just because of the use of those terms victim and abusers :

Women’s Aid have done valuable work on this topic, and it is largely thanks to their massive campaign that people seem to be sitting up and listening. They deserve credit for it, although I do not always agree with their methods or adopt unquestioningly all of their bold assertions. But the 25% statistic used by Oliver Heald does not come from court statistics, not from any proper research and it is unverified. It comes from a Women’s Aid survey of their own service users, which they have yet to answer questions about (see my previous posts about that here) [update 11 Jan 17 – they have now answered, see here]. The danger in such concerning but basically anecdotal and subjective evidence is that it may not be reliable or may become distorted by the process of stripping out important context. A striking example of this is the account given by an MP in the course of debate today that a “convicted murderer…sued for custody of their child from the prison where he was serving a life sentence for murder”. It seems highly unlikely that a person serving a life sentence for murder would be pursuing an application for a child to live with him. Instead it is far more likely that he was asking questions in the context of pursuing contact or was responding to an application made by extended family wishing to care for the child in light of the mother’s murder. Although it will have undoubtedly been very difficult for the witness, whose sister had been murdered by her questioner, it is of course not an example of a perpetrator cross examining his victim at all. We don’t know the details, and it must be right to expect the court dealing with such an application to control the court process very carefully – but it is difficult to draw conclusions from such snippets – for me this is a powerful illustration of the danger of anecdote.

That the minister for courts and justice Oliver Heald is happy to simply adopt the Women’s Aid guesstimate as fact is an indication of the real depth of consideration here. The minister needs to ensure that the government’s response is to the problem not to the publicity campaign. It all makes me concerned that we will be presented with a quick fix that in fact fixes very little. Let us suppose that a quarter of all victims of domestic abuse are cross examined by their perp (this would be a significant number as it is not limited to rape or serious physical abuse – and thus if we want to ban ALL of it a significant fix would be required). It would be unsurprising if a quarter of all those accused of domestic abuse would also express concern at their vulnerability in having to try and defend themselves against false allegations without help and against a state funded lawyer if asked to complete a survey on the topic. Who is to say which is the greater injustice when we have no proper research on either proposition,  and when our system depends upon us holding in mind the possibility of two alternate versions of reality until after the evidence has been heard?

In saying all of this I don’t minimise the legitimate concerns raised by campaigners and MPs about what is going wrong. But it isn’t the whole story and it isn’t the whole problem. And a mere BAN on cross examination by men who – in the main – aren’t terribly keen on enforced DIY cross examination in the first place is not the whole fix either.

Hair Strand Testing – some interesting information

Photo : lab stuff courtesy of iTc on Flickr - thanks!

Hair strand testing of parents (and other family members) is relatively common in family court cases, especially care proceedings. Most judges, and social work and legal professionals working in this field are therefore used to reading the now lengthy reports that are produced by drug testing companies, setting out and analysing the results. Over the years these reports have become increasingly lengthy due to the increasing amount of standard explanatory “blurb” that needs to accompany the bare result to assist with interpretation and in understanding the proper limits on the testing science. There is an evaluative element to hair strand testing, particularly in cases of suspected excessive alcohol use, and it is important to be aware on what the science is and is not capable of telling us and how probative an apparently positive result really is.

In a recent case Lextox reported as follows (the Family Court has given permission for this extract to be published in anonymised form).

Q : The donor of these results has afro-caribbean hair. Is the growth rate of this type [of] hair slower than other types of hair? Would slow growth of this particular type of hair affect the time it would take to show a negative result or have any other impact on the tests results?

When assigning time periods, Lextox use an average growth rate of 1 cm per month as per the guidance from the Society of Hair Testing (SoHT). However it is an average growth rate meaning that in some people hair can grow at faster or slower rates (With a distribution generally between 0.6cm – 1.4cm per month). In addition, the time periods calculated assume that the hair was cut as close to the scalp and as straight to the scalp as possible. Due to the very curly nature of Afro Caribbean hair, this can make cutting the sample close to the scalp difficult. Therefore the time periods are quoted as approximate and should not be over-interpreted.

It is my understanding that Afro Caribbean hair grows at a slower rate than Caucasian hair. A 1 cm section of Afro Caribbean hair may therefore cover longer than the assigned 1 month time period. If [the subject’s] hair has a slower than average hair growth rate then the levels detected would be unaffected however the time covered by the hair analysed would be longer.

It is possible for a donor to provide a positive hair test result for approximately 3-4 months following cessation. This is because with Caucasians approximately 85% of scalp hair is growing at any one time, with the remaining approximate 15% in the resting (non-growing) phase. When an individual has regularly used a drug for example cannabis, stops and continues to abstain from using the drug it usually takes approximately 3-4 months for a person to return a “Not Detected” result. This is because the resting phase of the hair usually last [sic] 3-4 months. As the resting phase consists of only approximately 15% of the hair the levels detected are expected to be at “low levels”. A large decrease would be expected after the first month once an individual stops using cannabis followed by smaller decreases until a “Not Detected” is obtained after 3-4 months.

It is also my understanding that Afro Caribbean hair can have a higher percentage of hair in the resting (non-growing) phases. If this was the case, although it may not take longer to see a not detected result, the decrease in levels may not be as large as seen with Caucasians.

The usual blurb that this firm uses is as follows (I’ve not included all of it, just the bits that seem relevant to this issue):

Normal hair growth is a cycle composed of three stages, active growing (Anagen phase), transition (catagen phase) and a resting stage (telogen phase). There are significant differences in the relative proportions of actively growing hair and resting hair between different areas on the body. Scalp hair has been selected as a test specimen as it grows at a reasonably constant rate, ranging from between approximately 0.6-1.4cm per month with a population average of 1cm per month, and approximately 85% is actively growing (Pragst & Balikova, 2006) (Harkey, 1993).

…the time periods are approximate and calculated with the following assumptions :

  • The donor has a growth rate of 1cm per month
  • That the hair sample was cut as close to the scalp as possible
  • That the hair sample was cut straight with the scalp

A variation in any factors detailed above will affect the approximate time period calculated. …it can take approximately 2 weeks for hair to have sufficiently grown above the scalp to be available for inclusion within a cut hair sample…

When an individual stops taking a drug, it is still possible for low levels of drugs to be detected in a hair sample. This is due to the fact that at any one time approximately 15% of the hair is not actively growing. This hair would contain drugs that would have entered the hair during the period of drug use (Tsanaclis, 2007).

I asked for the extracted information above to be published because it seemed to me to be that although we all know (and are told in the blurb) that there are many caveats, assumptions and limitations to the interpreted results we receive, it is very easy to forget about the need to consider how the information contained in the report matches or jars with the other evidence in the case, before drawing conclusions. The extract highlights the fact that for a parent of Afro Caribbean extraction, there is a greater risk that the assumptions relied upon could lead to the court concluding that the subject has been untruthful about the date of cessation of drug use in circumstances where that was not warranted. There is of course a risk of this in all cases, because all hair growth rate assumptions are based upon an average, but the risk is by definition greater for those who are part of a subset of the population whose hair tends to grow more slowly, is more difficult to cut and test, and which has a tendency to have a higher proportion of hairs in the resting phase. It’s just a risk, but it is not one that is likely to have been actively considered in the absence of any warning in the blurb materials.

I asked Lextox about this extract and whether or not they were aware of any research papers specifically covering the differences between Caucasian and Afro Caribbean hair, and whether they were considering expanding or altering their general blurb to highlight the differences in hair behaviour and characteristics between different ethnicities. They have sent me this response, from which it appears that they consider their general blurb to be sufficient. They did not point me in the direction of any research studies, indeed they did not answer that particular question.

The use of hair testing in family courts is a well-established science in use across the UK in thousands of family law and child care cases annually. Lextox’s expertise lies in the detection of drugs, metabolites and alcohol markers in hair using highly specific and sensitive instrumentation accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS). Lextox experts are also members of the Society of Hair Testing (SoHT), an independent international body which provides guidance on appropriate analysis techniques for the detection of drugs, metabolites and alcohol markers in hair. By complying with the SoHT consensus, Lextox therefore provides hair analysis within internationally agreed recommendations.

Among those operating within these guidelines, it is well known that there are a number of assumptions when it comes to hair testing, particularly regarding the time period covered by the hair analysed. It is not possible to determine the exact growth rate of hair on a case by case basis for each individual donor. Therefore, a common assumption regarding hair growth rates is required for use in all cases in order to apply an approximate time period to the specific hair section analysed – this being that scalp hair grows at a reasonably constant rate, ranging from between approximately 0.6 – 1.4 cm per month, with a population average of 1cm per month.  

As such, when assigning time periods to a sample, Lextox uses an average growth rate of 1cm per month as per the guidance of the SoHT to calculate all time periods reported. The SoHT does not recommend that hair types from alternative ethnic backgrounds are treated any differently, although it is also documented generally that scalp hair from donors of Afro-Caribbean descent may grow more slowly, sometimes as slow as 0.5 cm per month. In our opinion this does not differ sufficiently enough from the extreme ranges of Caucasian hair growth rate to have any significant effect on the testing procedures involved, and as such Lextox applies the guidance from the SoHT to calculate all time periods reported. This practice is standard within the industry.

With regards to the percentage of hair in the resting phase, again this cannot be determined on an individual basis, and can only ever be an assumption. As such, Lextox uses the percentages of growing and non-growing hair derived from scientifically published data to help in the interpretation of the analysis results.

In summary, Lextox assesses each hair sample submitted on an individual, case by case basis. Any hair sample that is deemed too curly to section into the requested sections, whether of Afro Caribbean descent or not, will not otherwise be sectioned and this information will be relayed back to the client with a number of options on how best to proceed with that particular sample. In such a case, the assessment is made purely in consideration of the physical nature of the sample submitted, as sometimes the hair is manageable by our suitably trained laboratory technicians to handle and accurately align, measure and section.  

In all cases if a client has specific questions on the analysis results, including those regarding growth rates and the growth cycle of hair, Lextox also considers these on a case by case basis and in doing so responds to all client and court related enquiries free of charge.

This statement (which I’ve quoted in full) refers to the Society of Hair Testing, of which Lextox are said to be members. I’ve no reason to doubt that, but unfortunately the SoHT website does not publish its members, which is surprising. And nor is there anything on their website which helps to illuminate matters. There is no mention of ethnicity or of different hair types in any of the material I can find on that site.

The “consensus” document referred to is on the site, and dates from 2004. It includes the simple line In general, head hair is estimated to grow at approximately 1.0 cm per month.” But otherwise nothing much of relevance to this issue. Read in context it appears this was originally agreed by the members of the society as long ago as 1997.

There is a 2011 “statement” which appears to be good practice guidelines. It includes this passage :

It is accepted that head hair grows at an average rate of 1 cm each month [12] and a sample cut from the posterior Vertex region of the head, close to the scalp is preferred as this region of the scalp is associated with least Variation in growth rates. The amount of hair required for analysis is a “lock of hair” or a pencil thickness of hair. It is important to collect sufficient hair in order to carry out routine tests and to allow for a repeat analysis or confirmation test by a second laboratory.

Concerns are often raised in relation to leaving a visible “bald patch” of particular concern with small children or individuals with baldness or thinning hair. In these cases, collection of several smaller hair samples from multiple Sites, focusing where possible around the posterior Vertex region is acceptable.

Head hair is the preferred sample, however, if head hair is not available alternative collection sites should be considered including pubic, underarm and beard hair. Collection of intimate samples requires consideration for the privacy of the donor while ensuring that the integrity of the collection process is not compromised. Growth rates and dormancy characteristics of hair from these alternate sites, differs from head hair.

The reference [12] is to a 1993 paper : M.R. Harkey, Anatomy and physiology of hair, Forensic Sci. Int. 63 (1993) 9-18, (a time when hair strand testing was emergent, as far as I understand it – indeed the SoHT was founded in 1995).

None of the references to research papers that I can find on the SoHT OR appended to the standard blurb in Lextox reports appear superficially (i.e. based on their title) to relate to the issue of different characteristics of hair taken from particular ethnic groups.

I do not presently have the capacity to track down, pay for and read all of those references, or indeed to search for those not listed – so I may be wrong about this – but it is not entirely clear that there is very much good research about this issue at all, and I wonder (it is no more than that at present) whether when it is said that “it is also documented generally that scalp hair from donors of Afro-Caribbean descent may grow more slowly, sometimes as slow as 0.5 cm per month”, this may mean that this is anecdotally a known issue, but nobody has yet bothered to do any robust research on it.

When I have a moment I will send a copy of this blog post to the SoHT and ask them if there is anything relevant, and will update if and when any response is received.

If anybody has had cause to explore this issue or read the relevant papers in one of their cases I would be grateful for any further light that you can shed on this. I doubt in reality that I will have time to do much follow up any time soon given other commitments.

 

Feature Photo : lab stuff courtesy of iTc on Flickr – thanks!