Summary of Legal Aid Reforms to Family Law

Nearly Legal has provided an excellent summary of the legal aid reforms in respect of housing and other areas of law: Ask not for whom the bill tolls. Due to other commitments I have not been able to put together a full analysis of the Bill insofar as is relates to family law. That will follow, but here is a summary of the position (largely borrowed from someone else I’m afraid).

Headlines: The confirmation of the removal of large numbers of private law cases from scope of legal aid, and of the reduction of family fees by 10% (on top of the FAS cuts implemented in May).

The Bill

Part 1 of the Bill itself is dedicated to Legal Aid (Clauses 1-40). The Bill contains provisions to abolish the LSC and transfer the day-to-day administration of legal aid to the Lord Chancellor. In practice, this will be done by civil servants in an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice. However, decisions on legal aid in individual cases will be taken by a statutory office holder: a civil servant designated by the Lord Chancellor as the Director of Legal Aid Casework. The Lord Chancellor will have no power to direct or issue guidance to the Director in relation to individual cases

There are empowering sections for the Lord Chancellor on legal aid issues, there is some provision about funding legal services and eligibility for legal aid (Clause 20). By Clause 36 the Legal Services Commission is abolished.

Clause 9 is an important provision for the payment of legal aid for ‘exceptional cases’ (i.e. where failure to do so would be a breach of the individual’s Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998). It is clear from the tenor of the response paper that the Government anticipate that this will be a narrow category, albeit with some initial boundary testing via JR.

In Part 2 of the Bill there is provision (Clause 45) for a new section 22ZA of the MCA 1973 for the payment of a sum to enable the other party to obtain legal services in proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation. Clause 22ZB sets out the matters to which the court should have regard in a legal services order.

Schedule 1 sets out the categories of cases in and out of scope. Schedule 1 is structured in a rather confusing way with a set of “excluded services” and other “exceptions and exclusions” some of which then don’t apply in certain instances. I suggest you tackle it in print rather than on screen. Continue Reading…

Legal Aid, Sentencing & Punishment of Offenders Bill Published

The Legal Aid, Sentencing & Punishment of Offenders Bill (LASPOB for not-so-short?) was published earlier today. And then rapidly un-published. However, the ever excellent ilegal was quick off the mark and had saved it before it was magicked away again. You can read the bill here.

From a quick whizz through insofar as it is relevant to family law it appears little has changed since the Green paper. No big surprises immediately declare themselves – of note though is the removal of ToLATA from scope – so cohabitees with claims to property are comprehensively stuffed and will have to fall back on the state because they can’t enforce an entitlement their own home – brilliant cost saving that. The definition of “abuse” has been recrafted into something which means – well, who knows what it means. It seems that questions of whether an adult or child is at risk of abuse will be left to civil servants on funding applications since the LSC is being abolished. These are of course the substantive questions in much children litigation which rather begs the question. Other changes include placing the courts power, developed through caselaw, to make orders for one party to contribute to the legal costs of the other on an interim basis – on a statutory footing, rather than as a species of MPS.

As expected all arguments about equality of arms have fallen on deaf ears – only the complainant in respect of allegations of abuse will be entitled to representation and advice. The poor sod on the receiving end of serious serious allegations (whether true or not) will be left to his (most often his) own devices.

More later.

Legal Aid Reforms – It’s Not Rocket Science Boys

I could spout on and on about all the things wrong with the Legal Aid reforms set out in the Green Paper published last month (and indeed I already have), but in fact Polly Curtis has already done it for me, in this recent article in The Guardian – she is of course absolutely right about the disproportionate effect on women that these reforms will have, both because they are more often victims of non-physical forms of domestic abuse and because they are more often financially vulnerable, whereas a higher proportion of men will be able to afford to pay for lawyers where legal aid will not be available than would be the case for women. The government’s opining that it is necessary “to restrict the definition of domestic violence to one that could be demonstrated through “clear, objective evidence”” rather begs the question of whether or not it is appropriate at all to attempt to use such a concept as criteria for eligibility for legal aid in the first place. In order to protect one needs to adopt an expansive and flexible definition of abuse, for the worst abuse is often the least visible and the hardest to articulate.