Ooh. That rhymes. Anyway...
The Bar Standards Board (regulators for barristers) are conducting a consultation on whether or not the standard of proof for disciplining barristers should be the criminal standard (as it now is) or should change to the lower civil standard.
First, a recap : the criminal standard means that, just as in a criminal trial, a thing isn't proved unless the judge (or jury) is satisfied so that it is sure (or beyond reasonable doubt) that the crime has been committed. The civil standard means that a thing is proved if the judge thinks it is more likely than not (i.e. 51% or over) that the thing in question happened.
My initial response was - "Hell no! Leave it as it is. This is our careers we're talking about, people. V important." Plus, thought I, all the other professions use the criminal standard, so its a no brainer.
Except, apparently, whilst I wasn't looking almost all the other regulators have gone over to the civil standard, the sneaky rats. It's just us and the vets appaz, out there on a limb with our "beyond reasonable doubt". Getting away with badness and thumbing our noses at the regulators if they can't prove a thing to the criminal standard. Or, quite rightly being found innocent of a bogus charge because there is insufficient evidence - depending on your perspective.
The consultation document is actually quite an interesting read and thoughtfully and accessibly put together. It is quite persuasive, and sets out the shift in mood /expectation about this over the years by both regulators and by judges who have considered the issue (although it has not directly been determined). You can read it here.
But what took me to the consultation document was not a burning desire to learn about the caselaw and history of standards of proof in regulatory tribunals (though goodness knows it is practically all I ever dream about*) - I went to read it because I wanted to write this post, and thought I'd better make sure I knew what I was on about. I didn't as it happens (proof, if you needed it, that blogging is good for continuing professional development).
What had driven me to write this post was not a comparison with other professionals, but the jarring in my own head of my "Hell no!" reaction with the conversation often had on this and other family law blogs (and with afeared clients) about the appropriateness of the civil standard in family proceedings concerning children, particularly those involving adoption.
There are many who would argue (and have argued repeatedly on this blog) that it is wrong that the law allows the removal of children from their family forever when they have been convicted of nothing, and when it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that their parenting is harmful or risky. Those are respectable arguments, but they don't in fact represent the law and there are perfectly reasonable arguments in the other direction.
Although I've always been ambivalent about it (because one sees the awful consequences when the civil standard DOES lead to injustice), I've been able to articulate the very good reasons for the adoption of the civil standard in these cases : there are sound public interest reasons for doing so. Whether or not one is protecting a victim of domestic abuse through injunction or a child at risk of harm the civil standard gives you a better chance of protecting the vulnerable, and as such is justifiable on public interest grounds. It would be awful if child were left in or returned to a dangerous home and subsequently harmed because even though it was more likely than not that a parent had caused harm it couldn't be proved to the criminal standard. The complexity in family cases comes in where there is a countervailing risk - of depriving a child of his or her family (forever in some cases) - brothers, sisters, parents, aunties, grandparents - when it wasn't necessary at all.
Of course the lower the standard the greater the risk of injustice to the person "on trial", and in children cases the greater the risk of wrongful removal. But...
If the public interest in protecting vulnerable children from abuse or neglect by parents means that it is legitimate to "find" parents guilty of abuse even where no criminal charge has been brought, and even where the evidence is likely insufficient to secure a conviction, then it is difficult I think to argue that the public interest in protecting the public from rogue or incompetent barristers should not lead to a similar conclusion in relation to disciplinary proceedings for the bar. It's my career, but it's somebody's child. And there is a limited impact on the public we are protecting if some barristers are wrongly found guilty of misconduct (save insofar as it narrows the pool of good lawyers by one and may put off others from joining or staying in the profession so narrowing the pool further in future).
Though it makes me highly anxious as a professional, I have to acknowledge that if anything the public interest arguments in respect of the civil standard in family courts are stronger than they are in relation to disciplinary proceedings. The BSB consultation paper asks the very good question :
...why [should] barristers, and in some circumstances solicitors... be accorded what might appear to be preferential treatment as compared to other professions practising in the England and Wales?
and makes the very good point :
...it is not necessarily in the public interest for barristers to be able to avoid a disciplinary sanction when it is more likely than not that they are guilty of professional misconduct but a Tribunal cannot be “sure” of this. This position is likely to be perceived by the public as working in the interests of the profession and not in the interests of the public or consumers.
For sure I'd feel better protected against spurious or malicious complaints if the standard were higher, but if its good enough for my clients, and good enough for social workers it's difficult to say that the bar is somehow special and should be treated differently.
The alternative conclusion of course would be to agree with those who argue for a criminal standard in family cases, and to argue that all the other disciplinary / regulatory bodies have got it wrong. I know the injustice that can be caused in individual cases, but it cuts both ways.
The Webster family suffered a grave injustice - they were exonerated but it was too late for their children to be returned. But Ellie Butler suffered a grave injustice too - findings made on balance of probability that put her away from harm were later overturned at a rehearing and she was subsequently returned into the care of her parents, and was subsequently killed by her father (whose conviction for harming Ellie had been quashed). Even with the civil standard Ellie ended up dead. The criminal standard wouldn't have saved her. And any trial lawyer knows that even the civil standard is not to be sniffed at - many allegations made in family courts fail for want of sufficiently cogent evidence. Whatever the standard used accuser must prove.
Cases like Ellie's and the Websters are fortunately rare, but though this is no comfort for those rare cases where the system doesn't work inevitably no system is perfect. Adoption of the criminal standard would most likely result in more children being exposed to harm than the civil standard does. Neither can prevent all harm and injustice. But my strong, instinctive reaction to the suggest that I, as an individual, might be condemned on a lower standard for the public good is a reminder of how hard this is to come to terms with on an individual level.
*this is not true
Feature pic : Scales by Hittie Evie on Flickr (creative commons) - thanks!