New Cafcass Domestic Abuse Policy – lots of starting points, but where will we end up?

Cafcass has announced a new ‘domestic abuse practice policy’. The accompanying press release sets out a broader context, including the 2020 Harm Panel report, and the subsequent ‘national improvement programme’ initiated by Cafcass in response, but it pretty obviously follows hot on the heels of high profile reporting of cases where Cafcass are said to have contributed to unsafe decisions for the victims of domestic abuse and their children (notwithstanding that improvement programme). I’m thinking in particular of the recent coverage of two cases reported in the media, each involving a mother who alleged (and proved) they had been raped by the father, an initial Cafcass Officer who was dismissive of her allegations of abuse or their impact, and who, following an appeal by the mother, was subsequently replaced by a second officer of who went on to recommended an order for no contact and the removal of Parental Responsibility (PR) from the father. In both cases the court adopted the first recommendations before later adopting the revised recommendations following appeal i.e. ordering no contact and removing PR.

 

Two examples of why this policy is needed and the context to it

The first is a case which took place in Carlisle and was reported on here https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2023-10-21/family-court-files-mothers-ordeal-after-judge-dismisses-rape-allegation-in-error/ (judgments here https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2023/180 and here https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewfc/b/2024/12 ) The court ordered no contact, revoked PR, and permitted a change of name. The mother sought costs against Cafcass, though the court declined to deal with her application.

 

The second case was that of Kristoffer White (https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2024-08-31/mother-devastated-after-family-court-granted-rapist-father-contact-with-child/ and judgment here https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2024/182.html ). In that case the first Cafcass Officer supported ongoing unsupervised contact between a father who the court had found to have repeatedly raped the mother, and his child. After the mother’s successful appeal the newly appointed Guardian said that he was ‘a danger to women and children and he is unsafe to have any form of contact or involvement’, and his PR should be removed. Kristoffer White was named following an application by the media. In large part this succeeded because of his proven pattern of behaviour, the potential risk to other women and the fact that the prior conviction was already in the public domain.

 

There are many excellent social workers within Cafcass. But these cases are about as good an illustration of the inconsistency of approach of Cafcass towards domestic abuse and safety as one could have. Such inconsistency continues to have real life consequences. The Press release accompanying the publication of the document is frank in its acknowledgment that Cafcass needs to do better:

 

“I am sorry that some four years on from the Harm Panel report, there are still children and adults in family court proceedings who do not receive the protection they deserve and require. Family Court Advisers and Children’s Guardians work hard through their assessment and advice to court to protect many children and adults from harm every day. But for those for whom this isn’t so, it is not acceptable and we are determined to continue to improve and to strive to protect every child and adult in family proceedings. The new policy that we are publishing today is a very significant step to further improve the way, together as a system, we protect child and adult victims of domestic abuse.”

 

Clearly, getting it right the second time around in these two cases does not eclipse the very obvious and indisputable fact that there continues to be an inconsistent approach to domestic abuse within Cafcass (and it must be said within the family court system who more often than not rely heavily on their recommendations), and the mothers and children in these cases were very nearly exposed to unacceptable risk as a result of it – it was only as a result of the persistence of these mothers in pursuing appeals and re-hearings at great personal and financial risk and cost to themselves, that the court fully accepted the risks posed by the fathers who had perpetrated such serious sexual violence against them.

 

Of course, every family is different and comes with different risks and unique dynamics that give rise to different needs. In that context, professional social work judgment is a critical tool. But in this most sensitive of areas, domestic abuse, Cafcass wish to ensure that a particular line is taken. Superficially at least, it is difficult to criticise them for that. They have to do something. And much of what the document proposes as the appropriate response to a particular scenarios is no more than good practice in the majority of cases.

 

The policy document in fact begins by stressing that the policy is not intended to

 

‘supplant the professional independence and judgement of FCAs [Family Court Advisors] and Guardians’, but rather that it is ‘designed to support and strengthen the accountability of [Cafcass staff] in safeguarding children, staff, and the reputation of Cafcass’

 

But overall, the strong sense to the reader is that independent social work judgment has a limited role in this highly contentious area, and that the messaging is as much for the benefit of the watching public as it is for internal use.

 

Indeed, next in the introductory paragraphs, there is an explicit transparency-based claim that policies such as this

 

‘are public documents against which we can be held accountable collectively and individually. If they are not adhered to, Cafcass and individual FCAs and managers can be subject to challenge through complaints, the Parliamentary & Health Services Ombudsman, referral to Social Work England, or a Judicial Review’.

 

And so, the publication of this policy can be seen as part of an explicit attempt to restore public confidence in a service which transparency (through media reporting, judgment publication and serious incident and learning reviews) has exposed as lacking.

 

The publication of the policy – and the apology – is likely to be seen as an important achievement for those who have been persistently raising these issues for a number of years now.  I expect will be welcomed by domestic abuse campaigners. As long as (they will surely say) it is actually followed.

 

And we discovered with Practice Direction 12J, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. How will this policy translate on the ground? It will not magically placate the many critics of Cafcass overnight – but more importantly,  a policy simply cannot produce an instant culture change, or a deeper understanding of domestic abuse, and muscular management oversight does not stand in place of education and training – and although I have no particular experience or skill in managing staff, this very public recipe for change does have much more of a stick vibe than it does a carrot flavour. Perhaps that is necessary some four years after the harm report, but it is certainly a marked shift in tone.

 

My educated guess is that if implemented to the letter, this policy will have some really profound practical and resource implications. I don’t know if those resource implications have been thought through and planned for, but I do know that judges, Cafcass and social services (all of whom will be affected by this policy) are overstretched in the extreme and that it seems vanishingly unlikely that some pot of money is about to be lobbed in their direction by the new government. I’ll explain what I think those resource implications are below.

 

Not only does the policy have to be followed to be effective, and not only do the resources need to be in place across the system to respond to the additional pressures its implementation will create – but it also has to be interpreted and followed correctly. Clearly drafted, straightforward policies are a pre-requisite of that. This document may only be six pages, but it packs a lot of policy in a small space, liberally deploys the use of bold to emphasise key messages (and implicitly to de-emphasise less important subsidiary points), and repeats similar phrases in slightly different contexts. There are 13 instances of the phrase ‘starting point’. Having multiple  ‘starting points’ depending on the context is a recipe for confusion. The structure of the document is hard to follow and in the rush to prove that Cafcass now ‘gets’ domestic abuse I fear that some of the language chosen is regrettably and predictably problematic (of which more in a moment).

 

The General Framework

The general framework though is this:

 

Any departure from any of the various starting points

 

‘must be supported by a compelling rationale, discussed with a manager, and recorded contemporaneously on the child’s case record’.

 

This phrase is like a repeated refrain. In very broad overview, the policy is that if there is any hint of domestic abuse (proven or otherwise) Cafcass there should be a recommendation for no contact, and if contact is happening there should potentially be immediate efforts made to stop it (including removal of a child from the care of a perpetrator), a risk assessment should be carried out and a referral should be made to social services. And that any Cafcass officer who wishes to say otherwise will have to persuade their manager before putting it in their report.

 

I wonder how frontline Cafcass officers feel about this publicly didactic messaging? Messaging that implies they can’t be trusted (many would say rightly, but that is not my point here). I wonder how many will interpret the slightly vague reference in the opening paragraphs to potential ‘fair and reasonable consequences for non-compliance’ as a reference to potential disciplinary action if they don’t tow the line? I’m not sure that is what is meant, but it’s unhelpfully cryptic. I wonder if on a workforce level this might have some unintended consequences.

 

Key Points

I’ll summarise the key points below. After each I have given my own (very much anecdotal) view as to whether they represent a departure from current practice, acknowledging of course that my experience is just a limited perspective and may not be representative:

  • When an adult describes a sexual offence or other criminal acts of violence (so, basically any allegation of domestic abuse), there MUST be a s16A risk assessment report to court, and a referral to the local authority with a recommendation that the LA support the victim to complain to the police. In the case of a NFA this must be followed up and escalated if Cafcass consider the child is left / placed at risk of harm. In my experience there is currently a s16A risk assessment and referral to the LA in a small proportion of cases (I am not aware of any stats about this but it might be a good topic for an FOI). These referrals are (IME) almost invariably NFA’d and that’s that. If implemented in each of the 60-70% of the 50,000 odd private law cases each year involving such allegations that is going to generate a huge amount of work for Cafcass, for LA’s and for courts to whom the s16A reports are submitted. And I mean HUGE. Even if they all result in an NFA.
  • ‘When there has been a report or disclosure of any form of domestic abuse (including any sexual offence) and a child is living with the accused parent, practitioners must urgently assess the child’s safety and welfare… The starting point in these circumstances must be a discussion with a manager and consideration of what actions are required to safeguard the child, which will include whether there should be any recommendations to change the current living arrangements.’ In my experience it is rare for there to be an interim recommendation to change living arrangements in these circumstances. And what happens if there are cross allegations of domestic abuse? Will Cafcass recommend foster care in their s16A risk assessment or referral report?
  • Where a parent is being investigated by the police for a sexual offence, has a conviction for a sexual offence and/or has served a prison sentence for a sexual offence, the ‘clear starting point’ is for a child not to spend time with that parent due to the significant risks that exist. In my experience I would say that if the investigation or conviction relates to a sexual offence is against a child there is usually no contact at least pending the investigation / trial, but that is less often the case where there is a pending investigation for a sexual offence against the other parent.
  • There are reminders about the need to look out for patterns of behaviour especially in repeat / long running proceedings, and not to dismiss or minimise domestic abuse as ‘historical’ or one-off. This, in my experience, is increasingly recognised but remains inconsistent, particularly where the pressures on court time in relation to listing fact finding hearings really pinch.
  • If a FFH is being recommended then (in line with PD12J paras 25-27) consideration must be given to whether any existing contact should continue. Fine, this is just a repetition of PD12J and in my experience is reasonably consistently followed, though that doesn’t mean there is always no contact pending a FFH.
  • There should never be a recommendation for parents to supervise contact where one parent has ‘disclosed’ domestic abuse – even if they are offering. Quite right too, and I think this is largely the position anyway once matters get into court. What does still happen is that a parent alleging domestic abuse is still expected to manage handover and communication – oddly there is nothing about that in this document. An important topic and both a surprise and a shame that it is not tackled.
  • Practitioners must not support or recommend any contact (direct or otherwise) or spending time arrangements, where the resident parent and child are currently living in a refuge, having ‘disclosed’ domestic abuse by the other parent. In my experience this is not universally the case, and video or contact centre / supervised contact is sometimes ordered if it can be done without compromising the confidentiality of the refuge location. So, I think this will represent a change in practice (assuming of course that the court’s adopt all such recommendations). The later assertion that ‘Secondly if it is necessary for someone to be living in a refuge for their safety, then the criteria for high risk of harm or further harm will have been established’ seems to be predicated on assumptions about the underlying facts that in some cases will be contentious. It may be that this is intended to relate to an interim situation pending findings, but if that is correct the document doesn’t say so, which is suboptimal.
  • There is a brief reference to allegations of ‘parental alienation’, but only to prompt officers to ‘consider whether the cause of this refusal is because the child is victim of domestic abuse and harmful parenting’. I don’t think this represents a departure from current policy, though it has to be said it may represent a departure from current practice in some cases (in my experience). I’m not sure if the use of the term ‘parental alienation’ in inverted commas, rather than the more up to date phrase ‘alienating behaviours’ is intended to be as pointed as it is on my reading. I note that here Cafcass think its just fine and dandy to use the term ‘alleges’. Why is it ok in one context but not another? Why is the outdated term ‘parental alienation’ used, and in inverted commas? Drafting choices like this make Cafcass hostage to fortune and susceptible to criticism from another perspective. Parents who complain of alienating behaviours (which includes some mothers by the way) are entitled to have their allegations respected and listened to as much as parents who allege domestic abuse. It is possible to do this whilst also keeping an eye out for such claims being part of a pattern of controlling behaviour wrought through the proceedings.
  • Cafcass officers are to assess life-long harm caused by domestic abuse and to adopt a starting point of not recommending contact following domestic abuse without clear evidence of recognition, acceptance of responsibility, action to demonstrably change their behaviour and attitudes and an assessment of reduced risk. This is no more than an exposition of the guidance in Re L (a seminal case from 2020), much of which is contained in the previous Cafcass domestic abuse pathway. Many, including me, would say that this learning is still inconsistently applied. The two example cases certainly evidence that.
  • Although it is dealt with on and off throughout the document there is a specific section on sexual offences (I’ll come back to the title of that in a moment). That states that where there is any report of sexual offending ‘such as rape’ the starting point is to consider suspension of contact. If a FFH is scheduled, the starting point should be no direct contact until after the FFH. If there is a pending police investigation there should be no contact until the end of that process (which could be years by the way, and could be well after the FFH in the family court). If there is a conviction the starting point is no contact. Weirdly, there is no equivalent ‘starting point’ where there is a finding by the family court, which I think is probably a drafting error (or perhaps is covered in the general ‘Re L’ type starting point about findings of abuse). Nonetheless, something it would have been better to be explicit about given the history of particular failings to appreciate the significance of rape findings in recent cases, but there you have it. I have encountered far too many cases where ‘what happens in the bedroom’ is not seen as a barrier to contact. I think that is changing but I would not say it is embedded either for all judges or Cafcass officers.

 

A word about language

 

Paragraphs 9 to 11 are about language. Practitioners are told that they must use the person’s own words to describe what they say has happened. So, if someone describes a rape it should be described as a rape not as ‘non-consensual sex’.  That seems quite right to me. But this passage gets more didactic and more problematic as it continues. There is an emphatic and outright bolded prohibition on the use of ‘claims’ or ‘alleges’.

 

The guidance does follow with a reminder that the court will determine any disputed facts on balance of probabilities, but this falls short of a reminder that Cafcass officers should take care to retain neutrality, and is at the very tail end of a long passage of text and apparently does not merit an emphasis with bold text.

 

Whilst insensitive use of terms like ‘allegations’ can make a victim feel undermined, and whilst ‘s/he said’ or ‘s/he told me’ is often much better (and indeed I’ve said as much in blog posts before, there are contexts in which it is necessary for professionals to draw a distinction between a proven or admitted act and an alleged one, since it is important to maintain neutrality on matters of contested fact. In fact this document would have benefitted from some judicious use of the term ‘allegation’, so that it was crystal clear how and when the policy is to be applied. Instead there is a mishmash of ‘reported’, ‘disclosed’  and ‘said’, apparently thought to be interchangeable (reader, they are not interchangeable), The result is that I struggled to understand when reading the document whether a particular passage or starting point was intended to apply in the interim pre-findings/conviction or afterwards or both.

 

The use of ‘disclosed’ is not a one off either. There are half a dozen occasions when it is used. It even makes it into the ominous heading ‘Report, disclosure, investigation or conviction of sexual offences’ (sic). Ominous because the word ‘disclose’ is or should be a red flag. For 37 years since the Cleveland Report judges have been repeatedly deprecating the use of the term ‘disclosure’ and a culture of belief, which can cloud professional judgment, contaminate evidence and lead to miscarriages of justice (again, see my previous blog post) and the judgment of McDonald J in Re P [2019] EWFC 27:

 

Finally, by way of introduction, it is necessary to highlight an issue of terminology that has, once again, arisen in this case (see AS v TH (False Allegations of Abuse) [2016] EWHC 532 (Fam) at [33]).  Despite the fact that the use of the term ‘disclosure’ to describe a statement or allegation of sexual abuse made by a child has been deprecated since the publication of the Cleveland Report in 1987 (see Paragraph 12.34(1) of that report), due to it precluding the notion that the abuse might not have occurred, nearly every professional who gave evidence in this case, including the investigating police officers, used the term ‘disclosure’ to describe what the children had said […], or to describe what they understood the children to have said to others.  Within this context, where a witness has used the word ‘disclosure’ that word is used in this judgment when quoting passages of documentary or oral evidence from that witness.  Otherwise, this judgment uses the term ‘allegation’.  Before too much approbation is heaped on those witnesses, I note that both Government guidance and publications from the NSPCC now use the word ‘disclosure’ even when speaking of matters that have not yet been the subject of proof to the requisite standard.  Finally, I pause to note that very few of the professionals, police officers and allocated social workers who gave evidence in this case had heard of the Cleveland Enquiry, much less were aware of its recommendations, and the guidance and good practice it underpins.  This is a topic that, unfortunately, I must return to at several points during this judgment.

 

There are repeated references to ‘disclose/disclosure/disclosed’ in this document, and it is not always clear when a ‘starting point’ or passage is talking about interim arrangements when allegations are live but unresolved, or arrangements once domestic abuse has been admitted or proved. This may just be over hasty or over enthusiastic drafting (or perhaps the product of drafting by committee), but it may also be indicative of a failure to appreciate the importance of maintaining proper professional roles and boundaries) – or at any rate may inadvertently prompt a blurring of those boundaries. If the senior leadership at Cafcass who approved this policy did not appreciate the issues with the word ‘disclosure’ then shame on them. They need to do some reading.

 

Some thoughts

 

The document has only been out a week or so and already I’ve seen the starting points and the words in bold referred to in written submissions, offered up as an approach that the court should adopt. This is worrying. This is guidance for Cafcass officers making recommendations, not for judges whose task is to consider the evidence of Cafcass alongside all the other evidence, including that of parties who may take a different view. There is not a single reference in the document to the applicable law. If judges adopt these starting points in their own role as decision maker they may be led into failing to independently and properly scrutinise and evaluate the individual facts against the full welfare checklist and PD12J as their responsibilities demand. I think it is possible that this document will become, at least briefly, a focus of legal argument in cases – another gloss or shortcut that will take up the attention of lawyers and judges, distract them from the unique features of the case and the actual law and lead to appeals. It may be argued on the one hand that its application has led a Cafcass officer into a formulaic or even discriminatory recommendation, or in another that a recommendation for contact that is not in line with the starting points is necessarily wrong.

 

Sadly, there is also, I think, a danger that this guidance will lead to reports from Cafcass which adopt a position of belief and which are then susceptible to legitimate challenge, or which adopt the ‘party line’ without proper reflection on the unique facts of the case, meaning they are less helpful to judges tasked with a fact specific evaluation, and consideration of ‘all the circumstances’ by law, and difficult for judges to rely upon. This helps nobody. It is not just a question of fairness to alleged perpetrators (who are most likely to be aggrieved with this policy and the resultant recommendations), but also and importantly to victims (both child and parent). This is not the first time I have read documents from Cafcass on the topic of domestic abuse which blur these boundaries and give an impression that Cafcass officers may or should be drawing their own conclusions about the validity of allegations (see here and here). That these basic points have not been identified in the drafting and internal QC processes which go right up to the top brass in Cafcass is surprising.

 

It will also be immediately apparent to anyone willing to see things from the other side of the fence, and to acknowledge that false or exaggerated allegations are a real phenomenon, that this document is a handy cut out and keep guide for anyone who might be motivated to stop contact between their child and their ex. As night follows day it will be said (with some force) that documents of this sort create a perverse incentive for the minority of parents who are willing to act maliciously or dishonestly to achieve their goal of stopping contact. I don’t subscribe to the view that many or most allegations of abuse fall into this category, but it is fundamental to the court process that, where there are important disputes of fact, they are dealt with fairly by open minded professionals rather than being either immediately and unquestioningly accepted as true (as some quarters alarmingly appear to suggest is the only right approach to domestic abuse allegations), or dismissed and discounted as irrelevant or false (as in the two cases I started this piece with). Children and domestic abuse victims deserve better than either of those wrong-headed approaches.

 

I hope I am being unduly pessimistic about this document. I’ve been mulling it over in my mind and reading and re-reading it and can’t shake off my worries. It is a much needed attempt to address a genuine issue about inconsistent and unsafe practice around domestic abuse, and to ensure a safety first approach – it has no doubt in part been brought about by public scrutiny of the approach taken in cases like those of the two mothers I’ve used as examples above, and change is most definitely needed – but for my part I would rather see practice change because more Cafcass practitioners begin to understand domestic abuse properly and to appreciate risk better, than because they’ve been told what to say by the Corporate Management Team.

 

Change clearly isn’t happening fast enough, but I do increasingly often read really good reports from Cafcass Officers who do really get it, who understand why domestic abuse is relevant, how it can insidiously be perpetuated, and how it continues to impact on parents and children long after separation. This document is no doubt one of several steps being taken and so shouldn’t be seen in isolation, but I’m not sure how much this top down approach will create the conditions for real learning as opposed to mere compliance (only the former and not the latter is persuasive in the witness box).

 

I hope also that the volume of mandatory referrals that this policy is likely to generate does not divert precious resource from where it is really needed, and that the outcome is a safer family court for survivors and their children.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Children Law Conference

The family practice group at St John’s Chambers, are holding a whole day children law conference on 19 November, at We The Curious in Bristol. We’ve worked really hard to put the programme together and have tried to squeeze in something for everyone.

The morning is going to be mainly private law, the afternoon mainly public law. We have a range of speakers dealing with an array of topics, both members of the St John’s family practice group (including moi) and external speakers include Lisa Harker from the FJO and BBC Correspondent Sanchia Berg.

I am told that places are filling but there are still some available, so if you are pondering how best to acquire your CPD, or interested in topics such as transparency, parental alienation and domestic abuse, or covert recordings in children cases then this is one for you. And of course we will make sure there is a good old case law update. Come for half a day or the whole day.

More information and details of how to book on the SJC website here

 

Kirstie gets a telephone call from the social

I had a call earlier. Did I want to do a TV interview about Kirstie Allsopp and child protection? Er…on the Sunday afternoon of the August bank holiday weekend? To be quite honest, no. I’ve not got my face on and I’m in the middle of prepping for a trial, which involves some actual child protection issues (such is the traditional August bank holiday weekend activity for us lawyers – though we did have a barbecue like a normal family yesterday).

I’d vaguely noted it on the radio as I snoozed before getting up, briefly raising an eyebrow at the fact that a social worker making a telephone call to a parent had made the national news, and then briefly raised the other one at the insistence of the LA involved that they take EVERY child protection referral VERY SERIOUSLY (their statement was read as if in CAPS), before rolling over and continuing my snooze. I wasn’t wild about going on tv to talk about such a non-story. Those who wish to read about the non-story may do so here (or elsewhere).

But every time I open up social media for a bit of light relief from the grimness of my prep, there it is. Someone outraged at the treatment of Kirstie by ridiculous social workers, someone ridiculing Kirstie for her outrageously risky parenting, someone else making a point about class and entitlement. So I guess, it is a story after all.

May I introduce a soupçon of legal insight to this ‘conversation’?

Section 47 of the Children Act 1989 (not the Children’s Act, if you care). It applies to all local authorities in England and Wales, and all children living in their area. Even those whose parents are loaded, or celebrities or both.

Here it is – you can read it in full on the legislation.gov.uk website. But the key bits are:

Where a local authority [social services] are informed that a child who lives…in their area have reasonable cause to suspect that a child who lives…in their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm, the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.

So, if a genuinely concerned person with legitimate worry, or a busybody, or a keyboard warrior or a malicious person calls social services and says ‘hey social services, I think this child is at risk because x’, that triggers a statutory process. Social services can’t just ignore it unless it is immediately and clearly obvious that there is no reasonable cause to suspect the child is likely to suffer harm. They have to check it out. For the avoidance of doubt, the identity or status of the parent is not a good reason to decide to ignore a child protection referral.

One assumes from her reported response that Kirstie has not had the pleasure of a call from social services before. Lucky her. Where a referral is made about a family who is not known to social services a telephone call is an entirely predictable and proportionate response. ‘Let’s check this out’ say social services. A simple telephone call is often enough to satisfy them that there is in fact no reasonable cause to believe there is a risk of significant harm to the child, and that will be that, Particularly so if the parent is able and willing to explain the context that might not be apparent from the referral.

From the responses online its clear that some people hold the view that it is OBVIOUS Kirstie is guilty of BAD PARENTING. However it is also clear that others think it is OBVIOUS that she has done nothing wrong. Some (and I’m probably in this camp because i’m a lawyer and a parent of two very different teenagers), would say IT DEPENDS on the specifics (the child, the travel arrangements, the safeguards etc).

Even if you disagree with me on that, it is clear that there are a range of reasonable views about allowing a 15 year old to travel abroad without a parent. Which is probably why social services didn’t feel able to simply write off the referral without at least making a quick telephone call. That call from ‘the social’ is genuinely a very frightening experience for a vulnerable parent without Kirstie’s background, resources and platform. Kirstie reportedly felt sick when she got the call, but I doubt very much social services will be swooping in to remove her now 16 year old, safely returned young person to a place of safety, as often happens in the sorts of cases I see day in day out (and which I dare say her own local authority will be prioritising). If Kirstie felt sick, imagine how parents with real problems feel?

It’s not clear from the material I’ve read whether social services were satisfied that they should ‘NFA’ the referral as a result of that telephone call, but I’d expect them to be considering things like the age of the young person (he was almost 16 when he went and 16 just after return), his maturity, who was travelling with him (a 16 y/o companion), what arrangements were in place (funding, back up plans, accommodation, ground rules), and – given that he is now back and 16, whether or not any purpose could possibly be served by further involvement with the family.

How one sensibly exercises parental responsibility to keep a young person safe, whilst also fostering independence is a tricky balancing act – different parents will make different decisions based on how risk averse they are and their knowledge of their child.

Whilst it’s not for me to prejudge the outcome of the referral, it does seem unlikely to go much further. Regardless of that however, I can’t really see any basis for the apparent criticism of the LA for simply making a call to find out how this particular decision was made (so far). s47 is there for very good reason. Sometimes – often in fact – children finally get protection because of a referral from a stranger. Sometimes the referral seems like something and nothing but it is one loose thread that, when pulled, unravels a whole tangle of issues. I’m not suggesting that is the case with Kirsty, but it is the reason why local authorities – rightly – have to do a bit of due diligence when a referral comes in.

Whether you would let your 15 year old go on this trip, it would, I think, be a tall order to suggest that a well planned trip undertaken by two reasonably mature and well resourced 15/16 y/os gave rise to the sort of risk of significant harm that justifies state interference above and beyond a telephone call.

However, I am confident that if I am wrong in my guess we will all be finding out soon enough (and then I’ll tell you what happens when the LA isn’t satisfied there are no reasonable grounds). I’m sure the now 16 year old son will be absolutely thrilled at all this fuss.

Anyway, it’s a shame, isn’t it, that we can’t get so much airtime focused on the real stories playing out in family courts every day, stories both about children who need protecting from their parents, and parents who need protecting from one another or from the overreach of the state.

And on that note I’m back to my real work for a bit of relief from the awfulness of social media.